Circunstancia

ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN THE MAGHREB: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ALGERIA

Anneli Botha

- Introduction
- Brief historical overview
- Structure and area of activities
- Modus Operandi and Target Selection
- Spill-over to Europe
- Conclusion


Introduction

With a number of groups in the region trying to change the political dispensation in their respective countries, the threat of terrorism in North Africa is not a new phenomenon or challenge to safety and security in the region. Throughout history these groups have been confronted with operational and structural challenges, brought along by counter terrorism initiatives (both on domestic and international levels). Subsequently, in order to survive or to remain relevant these groups had to adapt their strategic focus, structure and operations into a transnational angle. Groups in Algeria were however the only ones able to present a significant threat, while groups in Morocco and Tunisia were driven underground, leading to a decentralized network that sporadically managed to commit acts of terrorism – more remarkably in Morocco than Tunisia. Despite the initial success of groups in Algeria, the Algerian state managed to increase its effectiveness in countering terrorist groups. As a result, those who remained operational were ‘forced’ to change direction, most notably reflected in the change in name of the Salafist Group of Preaching and Combat, better known by its French acronym GSPC to al-Qa’eda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb. In other words the AQLIM reflected this ‘need’ to remain relevant. It is however noteworthy that although its target selections haven’t changed much – operations predominately directed against members of the security forces and government – its tactics are becoming more and more indiscriminate, particularly through the execution of suicide attacks (a new phenomenon).

Despite this long history, commentators often refer to al-Qa’eda’s involvement in North Africa as a new trend. For example, David Welch, the US State Department's Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on 23 October 2008 made the following statement “After having reduced its influence and being defeated ideologically in the Middle East and Iraq, al-Qa'eda is trying to spread to other areas. That is why we have the need to combine all regional efforts to confront the threat.”[i] Despite growing reference to Al-Andalus in al-Qa’eda’s propaganda, it is essential to place the development of Islamist extremism in North Africa, including Algeria and its relationship with al-Qa’eda and the latter’s philosophy in historic context.

On an ideological level (returning to the name change of the GSPC) the relationship between al-Qa’eda and North African groups have an equally long history. Although often overlooked by more recent commentators the eventual name change of the GSPC only formalized this long process. This name change also openly propagated its regional intentions in providing an ideological framework of reference, in addition to providing training to less structured initiatives in the region and beyond. Using the Iraq card and local dissatisfaction with the ‘War against Terrorism’ a predominantly domestic focus turned to the transnational.

The following brief paper recognizes that the threat Islamist extremism and terrorism presents can be divided into two categories: Attacks perpetrated by individuals/groups affiliated to North Africa in Europe; and secondly, attacks directed at Western targets in North African countries. This paper will however specifically concentrate on the latter category with specific reference to Algeria (in particular developments since its name change). In conducting this assessment, analysis will concentrate on attacks directed at Western targets in the GSPC/AQLIM’s broader campaign.

Brief historical overview

Algeria, as with a large number of countries in North Africa and the Middle East experienced a re-emergence of extremism in the late 1980s and early 1990’s. Externally influenced by the defeat of the Soviet Union and the return of Afghan mujahideen (that included nationals from around the world), extremists found domestic conditions to their advantage. These included inter alia, closed political systems and poor socio-economic conditions made worse by urbanization and feelings of marginalization. Extremists had a number of rallying points in common, including:

·         Calls to replace the current political dispensation with more ‘Islamic’ governments;

·         Reference to the model of the Iranian Revolution (although Shi’a) in replacing a pro-Western ruler with an Islamic dispensation;

·         Creation of Israel and the subsequent Palestinian question placing a question mark on Western overwhelming support for Israel; and

·         The consequences of the First Gulf War, namely the perceived humiliation of Islamic fighters (Iraqi) at the hands of the United States (despite the Alliance that included Muslim governments) and the ‘settling’ of Western Christian forces in Saudi Arabia (that also host the most sacred sites in Islam).

Influenced by above-mentioned briefly referred to circumstances, a number of groups came to the forefront and ultimately disappeared from the scene during a long history of domestic terrorism that increased in magnitude after the cancellation of the first round of elections in 1991. Leaving Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) or the Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching. As a breakaway faction of the GIA, the GSPC initially focused its attacks predominantly on members of the security forces, adhering to Salafist interpretations and ideals. Initially, the group aimed to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and to establish a government based on Islamic principles. Although much can be said since Hassan Hattab formed the GSPC in 1998, the current head of the GSPC Abdelmalek Droukdel, alias Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, received renewed attention when he officially announced in January 2007 that it had changed its name to the al-Qa’eda Organisation for the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM). This step introduced a number or changes that impacted on the security, not only in Algeria, but also the region as a whole. Although al-Qa’eda was instrumental in the initial split from the GIA, due the latter’s indiscriminate killing of civilians, the GSPC under the leadership of Hattab supported a low key alliance with al-Qa’eda in which the organization would be predominately independent while its members would be trained by al-Qa’eda. However this position was not supported by other leadership figures within the GSPC or al-Qa’eda that opted for a closer alliance. Most notably Emad Abdelwahid Ahmed Alwan, a Yemeni national was sent to Algeria by al-Qa’eda to encourage a more formal relationship. Alwan was however killed by Algerian security forces in 2002. Despite this setback Hassan Hattab was ‘forced’ to step down, to be replaced by Nabil Sahraoui also known as Abu Mustapha Ibrahim. Despite assistance and use of networks in neighbouring countries, Nabil initiated a dedicated campaign in October 2003 to recruit Tunisian and Libyan nationals into the structure and operations of the GSPC in Algeria – indicating early attempts to present the GSPC as a regional organisation. Despite the fact that Algerian security forces killed Nabil in June 2004 (to be replaced by Abdelmalek Droukdel or Abu Musab Abdul Wadud), 2004 can be described as an important year for the GSPC in adopting its ‘new’ focus for two reasons:

1.      The GSPC established a dedicated Internet website with an equally dedicated propaganda arm; and

2.      War was declared against foreigners and foreign companies.

Despite this ‘new direction’, operations in Algeria remain to be traditional, as will be briefly referred to later in this paper.

Structure and area of activities

Regarding the GSPC’s structure, officially the organization is divided into zones, of which the following three zones are the most active: Zone 2 (also incorporates the central command that include Algiers, Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou and the Kabylie region); Zone 5 focusses its attention on eastern Algeria with its border with Tunisia (that also includes Tunisian and Libyan nationals); and Zone 9 includes the smuggle networks in Algeria’s southern border with Niger and Mali. An emir heads each zone, which is further subdivided into katibas, or brigades, with each katiba subdivided into three or four fassilas. A fassila in turn is made up of two sarayas, each with 12–18 members, often working in smaller groups of between two and six members. After the name change, Droukdel announced that four basic zones – Central (Algeria); East (Tunisia); South (Sahel); and West (Mauritania) – replaced existing zones. Although the GSPC incorporated other nationalities in its structure for a number of years, this announcement reconfirmed its regional ambitions. Assessing its actual size is unfortunately not an easy task due to its loose decentralized structure, as well as the fact that support can also come in the form of in-principle support that often result in the creation of support networks.

Support networks provide assistance in the form of documentation, firearms and safe haven. Support networks involving members of the same family and friends are common, and are especially difficult to monitor and infiltrate. Although support networks were also found in Western Algeria, during 2007, members of the security forces dismantled a number of logistical support networks in the east of the country; in areas close to Algiers, such as Blida, Jijel, Skikda and Bourmedes, as well as areas to the southeast, including El Oued. For example, with our attention on 2008, in January the gendarmerie arrested 12 nomad shepherds of a terrorist support network operating in southwest M'sila. Two people among those arrested made earlier use of President Bouteflika's national reconciliation and were freed from prison in 2006. In supporting the operations of GSPC/AQLIM, these shepherds sold stolen livestock to finance the purchase of weapons. Weapons smuggling is relatively common in the region that has even seen a development of arms factories. For the month of January 2008 alone, 45 hunting rifles, four of which were sawed-off, and nine Beretta automatic pistols were recovered in M'sila.[ii] Again in August security forces came across an old woman, who manufactured traditional firearms and ammunition. After investigations they also discovered a secret workshop inside her residence. This came after security forces during 2007 came across the existence of a workshop in a migrant investor’s house, who owned a restaurant in the centre of Tlemcen.[iii]

Although it is difficult to establish a relationship between support networks and networks recruiting fighters for Iraq, a merge into another could be expected for the following two reasons:

• Established support networks could redirect their focus to recruitment for Iraq as this cause is now more popular domestically than GSPC/AQLIM’s own campaign.
• Recruitment networks use the war in Iraq to attract new recruits who believe they will be sent to Iraq after basic training in Algeria but who are in fact being absorbed into GSPC/AQLIM’s domestic campaign.

In addition to North African legal and illegal immigrant communities that are merging Europe and North Africa security interests, the war in Iraq facilitates recruitment in both Europe and North Africa. Although to be expected, offering training to new recruits on their way to Iraq, contribute to growing concerns in Algeria – where and under what circumstances immigrant communities were radicalized in Europe are equally concerning. In one example Mbark el-Jaafari was arrested in February 2007 in Reus, Spain for recruiting 32 potential suicide bombers to be sent to Iraq via Algeria. Iraq was still used during 2008 as a rallying point. For example during late June eight Algerians stood trial after being charged of “recruitment for combat in Iraq” through a Tunisian national known as Aboulwalid. The eight Algerians, aged between 24 and 43 years, planned to join the fighting in Iraq in 2006 in Mostaganem Province, where they had been on vacation. One of the group members, Samir, offered help in contacting Aboulwalid who supervised a network that recruited militants from Arab states to fight the US forces in Iraq. One of the suspects, known as Hashimi, prepared to travel with four members of the group to Iraq after each of them raised 40,000 Algerian dinars to cover the travel costs. The cross involvement of different nationalities further contribute to a transnational character of organizations involved.

Mobile training camps, in particular those in northern Mali provided training to nationals as far south as Nigeria, nationals from neighbouring countries, other countries in Western Africa as well as individuals recruited in Europe. The attraction: recruitment networks for Iraq foreign fighters; as well as the image that AQLIM represents the interest of al-Qa’eda in the region. On this level the GSPC/AQLIM migrated from a domestic to transnational terror group. Ultimately the survival of GSPC/AQLIM depends on its ability to attract transnational attention. Although this might be the case with individual support, broader attention and integration is still a topic for discussion, particularly since the Libyan Islamic Combat Group aliened themselves with al-Qa’eda Central and not AQLIM. Although one could read a lot in this decision, a possible explanation might lay with the person who made this announcement and developments in Libya itself in relation to LIFG. According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu al-Laith al-Liby (subsequently killed on 29 January 2008) made this announcement in a joint video recording in December 2007. Analysts questioned Abu al-Laith’s influence in Libya, due to his status as a senior al-Qa’eda military commander based in Pakistan/Afghanistan, not Libya. Security forces in Libya defeated the group and forced many of its members to go underground or leave the country, ultimately leading to negotiations between domestic members of LIFG and the Libyan government, thereby placing a question mark on the weight this alliance has on the ground.

Irrespective of this analysis, successes in Algeria reflect the involvement of other nationalities in operations in Algeria. For example in late January 2008 security forces killed five terrorists, active in the "Abi Zeid Belmokhtar group" in the Rhourd Ennous area, 300 kilometres south of Ouargla. Those killed included individuals from Chad, Mali, Niger or Mauritania.[iv] During mid-March, operations in the Boudekhane mountains, in the Province of Khenchela, resulted in the elimination of five terrorists while several others were wounded. Most of the elements from this group were natives of sub-Saharan regions, particularly Mali, Chad and Mauritania.[v] Following the elimination of Libyan and Moroccan nationals before 2008 – (in 2006) the security services arrested a large number of foreigners who intended to join terrorist groups. In April 2007, three Libyans were captured, and members of the security forces again eliminated Libyan nationals in 2008. In early June 2008, the Algerian army in an operation in Khenchela killed another Libyan national that was part of a group of Libyans who had joined the GSPC/AQLIM to receive training in the use of arms with the aim of opening battle fronts in their country of origin.[vi] Essentially the border triangle between Mali, Niger and Algeria is a haven for AQLIM, since the kidnappers of the Austrian hostages used the Zawak valley in Mali. According to information at the time Yahia Djaouadi, the emir of the ninth region of the AQLIM hid the two Austrian hostages (who subsequently were released) in the area between Algeria, Mali and Niger. Kidnappers constantly moved between Mali and Niger in Ouad.[vii]

Modus Operandi and Target Selection

Although its modus operandi includes the resort to suicide attacks (an unfamiliar tactic in Algeria), the focus of its target selection, in addition to a few attacks directed against foreign workers/companies, is still directed against the Algerian state and its security forces. During 2007, 45 percent of attacks were directed against Algerian security forces, while 24 percent of attacks involved casualties of both members of the security forces and civilians. While during the first six months of 2008, 60 percent of attacks were directed at the security forces and 12 percent included casualties of both security forces and civilians. Notwithstanding this assessment on its target selection, the fact that the GSPC/AQLIM resorted to indiscriminate tactics such as suicide attacks, implied that although the target might represent the state, this indiscriminate tactic often result in mass casualties, including innocent civilians.

In answering the question: What does the GSPC/AQLIM hope to achieve through violence? The GSPC realized that its own organization became too weak (as a result of the reconciliation process, elimination and the arrest of key leadership figures) and in order to survive it had to adopt the al-Qa’eda brand, while al-Qa’eda could enhance its influence in this region through this alliance. Notwithstanding this strategy, Algerian security forces had a number of successes against AQLIM during 2008 (till date). In one of these successes security forces discovered a tunnel more than 400 meters long and eight blockhouses during early February in Sid Ali Bounab, 90 kilometres from Algiers. Clothing and food were also seized by the security forces who were looking for bomb-making labs of the Ettefdjir Katibat, led by amir Amar Torfi alias Abou Meriam, who, according to our sources, was reportedly behind the two attacks in Thenia and Naciria. Security forces acted on intelligence provided by the two repentants.[viii]

Considering the primary motivation of the GSPC to officially align itself to al-Qa’eda: To present itself as al-Qa’eda’s representative in the Maghreb – with the growing outrage from the public as a result of AQLIM’s indiscriminate killing of civilians while targeting government representatives, came a growing possibility that AQLIM might increase its attacks against Western targets. Since its official alignment (that came with the name change) in January 2007 till June 2008, 157 attacks have been recorded, of which eight attacks were directed against Western targets. During the same period fifteen suicide attack were recorded of which two were directed against Western targets, notably on 21 September 2007 when a suicide bomber targeted a convoy of foreign workers employed by a French company near Lakhdaria; and one of the 11 December 2007 suicide bombers targeted the UN offices in Algiers. On the topic of suicide bombings, it is important to note that in relation to other bombings, including roadside bombings, the use of suicide bombings is still a ‘limited’ tactic with 11 percent of bombings in 2007 and 9 percent of bombings recorded during the first six months of 2008 that reflected the use of suicide operations.

Countering the threat from suicide bombers, members of the security forces also enhanced the intelligence gathering capacity (particularly from former members that were captured or that surrendered to security forces), that in mid-February 2008 led to the distribution of a poster that included the photograph, age, address and town/city of 33 suspected potential suicide bombers, one of them a woman. Seventy percent of those identified came from Algiers, particularly from Kouba, Hussein-Dey, Bourrouba and Ain-Naadja while some are natives of Dellys, Boumerdes, Djelfa, etc. These identikits were obtained from intelligence provided by members of support networks arrested earlier.[ix]

It was not only Algerian security forces that had successes against AQLIM, in March 2008 an AQLIM cell active between Bamako and Timbuktu was broken up by the Malian security agencies. Abou Osama a veteran in the war against the Russian army in Afghanistan, fell into a trap that ultimately led to his arrest.[x] It was also announced that between January 2007 and March 2008 security forces successfully acted against several attempts to smuggle phosphates and concentrated fertilizers in eight provinces. An estimated 50 tons were seized from Souk Ahras, Tebessa and El Tarf provinces in eastern Algeria and Saida, Mascara and Sidi Bel Abbes provinces in the west. In the south, the authorities confiscated chemicals from Ouargla Province as came from Tunisia through El Oued Province.[xi] In addition to smuggle routes for chemicals used in the construction of explosive devices, firearms smuggle routes were also well established through history. This resulted in ‘alliance’ between terrorists and smugglers, the latter purely motivated by financial gain. The first weapons trafficking networks were established, particularly in certain regions that gradually specialized in that activity. As part of this, the communities of Magra, Djezzar, Barika, and many others in the provinces of M'sila, Biskra, and El Oued turning these areas into veritable nerve centres. This problem escalated to such an extent that since the late 1990's, it was easier to buy a Kalashnikov in Ouargla, Tamanrasset, El Oued, and Illizi than a car. Batna is however considered as the nerve centre of the arms trafficking. In countering this growing threat, security forces have set up permanent roadblocks all along the highways generally used by the traffickers resulting in a decrease in smuggling. Operations during the last few years also made use of metal detectors and canine patrols. With the exception of the Djelfa, M'sila, and Biskra regions and the border regions in the far south, the phenomenon also affects the country's eastern and western borders, particularly the provinces of Tlemcen and Tebessa where the trafficking of antipersonnel mines, explosive devices, detonators, detonator cords, slow wicks, and shells for hunting rifles occurs.[xii] In addition to the use of the region for smuggling, security forces also became increasingly concerned by an increase of extremist activities in western Algeria. For example in September 2008 a network of recruiters were broken up in Oued Rhiou. After the east, where they succeeded with operations against the security forces in Jijel, Skikda and Batna, the terrorists are trying to establish themselves in the western region, in the old fiefs of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), in Tissemsilt, Relizane and Sidi Bel Abbes in particular. The army however has retaken its positions on several strategic axes to prevent the terrorists from once again penetrating into the mountains of the region located between Relizane, Sidi Bel Abbes and Tissemsilt, and even the mountainous regions located between Tlemcen and the far west of the country.[xiii] In late August, in Oued Rhiou, in Relizane Province, security agencies also broke up a network of recruiters working on behalf of the GSPC. These recruiters used illegal immigrants to allow the new recruits to get to the Oued Djer region in Blida, where a terrorist leader took care of them. For each young man recruited, the recruiters received more than 500,000 dinars from the GSPC. The GSPC's recruiters target poor young men with a blank legal record and generally with no record with the security agencies.[xiv]

The ability of the GSPC/AQLIM to target Algiers in its attacks (after a period of calm in the capital since 2003) implied that the organization managed to reactivate cells and support networks in and around Algiers. Secondly, its structures in the south – in addition to act as a supply network – began to target Mauritania and southern Tunisia:

·         4 June 2005, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the former emir of Zone 9 killed 15 soldiers in an assault on a military base in Mreiti, Mauritania.

·         24 December 2007: Attack on a French family near Aleg.

·         30 December 2007: Attack on military base near Galaouia.

·         31 January 2008: Gunmen attack the Embassy of Israel in Nouakchott.

·         Two Austrian tourists were kidnapped in southern Tunisia between 18 and 25 February 2008.

·         15 September 2008: Members of AQLIM killed 12 Mauritanian soldiers as they were ambushed 70 kilometres (45 miles) east of Zouerat. The twelve men that went missing included a captain, a corporal, nine privates and a civilian desert guide. On 19 September they were found in the desert 30 kilometres northeast of the northern town of Tourine (all twelve were decapitated).

Western Algeria, in particular its border with Morocco and Mauritania also received increasing attention. In addition to above-mentioned attacks in Mauritania and continuous smuggle activities at the Moroccan border, growing concern was raised in relation to the activities of Al-Mahdhara. In an article published in early February 2008 it was mentioned that people from various nationalities legally travelled to be enrolled in these religious schools that promote Wahhabism, financed by people from the Gulf. The remote location implies that religious authorities and security forces cannot control its activities, particularly since these schools are located in desert areas, far away from the two nearest populated areas. According to the sources mentioned in the article, one of the schools is situated near a Moroccan border checkpoint called Karkarat; while one of the biggest religious schools called Mahdharat Maata Moulana with 25 branches is based in the region of Akjoujt, Mauritania. The same school has an estimated 3 000 students, including Moroccans who come from the south, especially from Laayoune and Goulimine. Another school is called Mahdharat Ahl Addoud where the Salafi Wahhabi thought is being taught to about 2 400 students from various nationalities. The school has 32 branches and is located in the Oued Ennaga region and it is one of the schools that have been functioning secretly in the region.[xv] Although not aligned to AQLIM the spread of Salafi and Wahhabi thinking in remote areas, beyond the watchful eye of the state, not to mention the level of isolation that accompanies these and similar structures, are concerning.

Despite the primary focus on Algeria, the following section hopes to briefly place the current felt threat presented by North African nationals in context. In addition to the arrest of Mbark el-Jaafari in February 2007 in Reus, Spain for recruiting 32 potential suicide bombers to be sent to Iraq via Algeria (and other similar operations, networks involving North African nationals in Europe is not a new trend). What is however new is the attention Western governments and security forces direct at these ‘networks’. Support operations were established in European countries in reaction to counter-operations in North African countries in the 1990s. Freedom of speech, association and the classification of extremism and associated terrorism in their countries of origin as ‘domestic’, even granting political asylum to extremists led to the creation of support networks to operations in Northern African countries, including Algeria. These support networks concentrated on:

1.      Providing safety for operatives wanted in North African countries (although the focus is on North Africa, extremists from throughout the world used Europe to their advantage). Specialized forgery cells further facilitated the settlement of wanted suspects.

2.      Financial assistance through legal as well as illegal means to support operations in their respective countries of origin. Fraud became an illegal means to financially support operations.

3.      Weaponry was also smuggled to particularly Algeria

4.      Recruitment

Although France was initially a favourite base, due to historic alliances with France (former colony), language was therefore not an obstacle. However, increasing counter operations against extremists in France (due to growing targeting of French nationals and interests in Algeria) led to a number of terrorist attacks in Paris in 1995/6. Subsequently operatives spread to other European countries, involving individuals from mixed nationalities. Activities in France already served as an example where a diversion away from support operations manifested in direct acts of terrorism. It also introduced vulnerabilities surrounding immigrant communities and the threat presented by the ability of extremists to be ‘integrated’ into immigrant communities. Linking immigration directly with terrorism might however further lead to marginalization and isolation, ultimately impacting on integration and the negative impact all of these issues have on radicalization.

Conclusion

Wrapping up this brief discussion on Algeria, the following strengths and vulnerabilities need our attention:

·         Following the loss of experienced GSPC members as a result of surrender, arrest or elimination by security forces, GSPC/AQLIM is trying to attract both foreign fighters and younger followers, including women – between the ages of 16 and 20 – though are often inexperienced, are idealists who can be easily manipulated. These new recruitment techniques have presented a new challenge to the security forces, in that it is more difficult to implement proactive measures against individuals with no previous records or who have not raised suspicion and are therefore unknown to security forces. In addition to these trends, radicalization often takes place over a short period and further place additional pressure on security forces.

·         Changing its tactics from targeting security forces in remote mountainous areas, on which members of security forces answered with search and destroy operations and aerial bombings, to suicide attacks in populated areas, influenced the need for security forces to change its tactics: Intelligence driven operations to identify and arrest those involved in a pro-active approach. This strategic change in thinking implies the need to restructure its intelligence structures, while the former emphasis was on the military. It also calls for the growing involvement of the public in coming forward with information on suspicious activities. In this context it is worth noticing that the involvement of the population in counter terrorism is well established, leading to a number of successes.

·         Growing pressure from the public as a result of its suicide operations, might possibly contribute to an increase in operations against Western targets. Although the 20 August 2008 attack in Bouira targeting SNC-Lavalin employees - that left 12 people dead and 15 wounded - was not discussed in this analysis, it is interesting to note that notwithstanding the statement “we are choosing our targets carefully and we are always careful with your blood. We do not target the innocent” those killed in the attack were Algerian nationals. The statement in itself reflects a growing intention not to target those classified as ‘innocent’, but rather to target and kill the intended target – foreigners and state representatives.

·         Presenting a regional focus implies the involvement of other nationalities and the operational focus of the GSPC/AQLIM beyond the jurisdiction of Algeria. Concerning is the fact that the person responsible for the attack against SNC-Lavalin was not Algerian, but from Mauritania (Abdul Rahman Abu Zeinab al-Mauritani) reflecting the success - although still early - to present AQLIM as a regional organization. Although Algeria has a good relationship with Tunisia, the relationship with Morocco is often challenging, while relations with other neighbouring countries might face similar challenges. This is worsened by the fact that long porous borders and the inability to establish territorial jurisdiction over its territories overall leads to uncontrolled areas that are being exploited by smugglers who also cooperate with terrorists.

On the question of vulnerabilities:

·         The GSPC/AQLIM lost support from within through its decision to adopt indiscriminate tactics, such as suicide attacks (an uncommon strategy in Algeria) as well as the leadership style of Droukdel in replacing experienced leaders since he questioned their loyalty. This led to a low morale and a number of surrenders.

·         Outrage and renewed resolve from the public to get rid of the organization, influenced after the decision of the GSPC/AQLIM to resort to suicide attacks, led to community members coming forward with information that resulted in the arrest of key members.

Any domestic based terror organization needs some kind of domestic support base, that impacts on its target selection and modus operandi. The fear however exists that when the group operates with a broader audience in mind, these self-imposed limitations are increasingly disregarded. From above analysis it is clear that GSPC/AQLIM finds itself in the middle: Although rhetoric is geared to sell itself as a regional organization, based on its target selection, the organization falls within the category of a domestic insurgent/terrorist organization, sporadically targeting a Western target to justify its existence. The future of the organization is still in the balance.

On the question of a link between the Maghreb and Europe and the threat this represents to European nationals in North Africa or European countries directly, much more can be said. Although operations in Algeria are predominately directed against traditional domestic targets, the fear exists that in order to ‘sell’ itself as a regional representative of al-Qa’eda, AQLIM will gradually increase its attacks against Western representatives and interests. In contrast to this potential new threat, Morocco and Tunisia reflected a stronger anti-Western focus in its prior target selection. Although attacks are far between (threat and previous incidents not discussed in this paper), uncovered plots reflected a definite Western target selection (in comparison to a traditional anti-Algerian government establishment focus in Algeria):

·         The 2002 Straits of Gibraltar plot;

·         Activities in Tetouan and its focus on Ceuta and Mililla as part of the liberation of al-Andulas;

·         The Mesahell cell plot to target the US embassy while recruiting potential fighters for Iraq coordinated with Algerian and Libyan operatives; and

·         In Tunisia, the Tunisian Combat Group plot to target US as well as Algerian and Tunisian embassies in Rome in December 2001

In addition to the threat to Western and European countries and nationals, the policies of European countries in dealing with extremism where nationals from North African countries are involved in, also raised concern in countries these individuals originated from. Deportation as a strategy to get rid of suspected extremists is seen by a number of officials as transferring the problem to North Africa. The fact that people (including those from North Africa) were radicalized in Europe, often resulted in individuals with European citizenship (although originated in North Africa) being arrested (without being able to successfully prosecute these individuals in Europe) led to questions, for example on how to deal with them on arrival in Algeria. Without being able to build a case beyond the jurisdiction of Algeria (in this case) these individuals might equally radicalize and recruit extremists to be used domestically or externally in current hotspots such as Iraq or even Europe, without addressing or defusing the situation, thus leading to a new cycle of extremism.

As with many countries around the world, the potential spill-over of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is also feared in Algeria. Again reconfirming the need for an intelligent and strategic approach and strategy to deal with extremism and terrorism, considering that everything is interconnected. Although countries might be under the impression of ‘dealing’ with extremism and terrorism, they might without realizing it, ‘export’ extremism and terrorism to another country.