THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CUBAN AMERICAN ‘EXILE IDEOLOGY’ IN MIAMI

Guillermo J. Grenier

During the past decades, Cuban Americans have attracted more than their share of attention from both the press and the scholarly community. Their visibility has exceeded the demographic reality. The slightly more than one million persons of Cuban-origin or descent account for approximately five percent of the Hispanic-origin population of the United States.

Demographics aside, however, there are good explanations for the relatively conspicuous presence of Cuban Americans within the U.S. Latino population. Most of those explanations are rooted in three basic characteristics of the Cuban presence in the United States:

1. Cubans are primarily responsible for the growth and development of the third-largest Latino community in the United States. Their concentration in the Greater Miami has created a Latino presence that accounts for over half of the total population of a metropolitan area that is frequently regarded as a harbinger of immigrant America in the 21st Century.

2. The socioeconomic selectivity of migration from Cuba during the past forty-four years has created a community with relatively large numbers of professionals and entrepreneurs. This socioeconomic profile, although at times overstated, has had implications for the participation of Cubans in leadership positions within the national Latino population, especially in such visible sectors as media and government.

3. As a self-defined exile community, Cuban Americans have developed a set of political institutions and political culture that are sharply differentiated from those institutions and cultures among other Latino groups. The political behavior of Cuban Americans has garnered considerable attention from the press, and many of the leading political figures and organizations of the Cuban-American community have been prominent at the national level in furthering the exile political agenda.

While the social-science literature on this community represents a respectable bibliography, the attention has not been evenly distributed across the three basic characteristics outlined above. The first two, community dynamics and socioeconomic adjustment, have by far attracted the most interest, while an understanding of many of the political dimensions of the community has largely escaped detailed analysis.

This is ironical, for political forces are at the core of the very origins of the contemporary Cuban-American presence in the United States. Furthermore, the press and the public have consistently focused much more on that third characteristic, in direct contrast to the situation in the scholarly literature. Whatever image most Americans have of Cuban-Americans is probably constituted, more than anything else, by political features such as staunch anti-Castroism, militancy, terrorism, political conservatism, and a predominant affiliation with the Republican Party.

The anti-Castro characteristic of the community might well be considered to be its master status, establishing the limits and potentials for all group activity.
Yet, is this monolithic political profile of an entire community accurate? There are various attributes of the community that, upon reflection, caution us against making that assessment. First, when we speak of the Cuban-American community, we are speaking of a group that has had almost a continuous flow into the south Florida region since 1959. This flow can be categorized into distinct waves, with different pull and push factors. Waves that have found different receptions and acceptance in the region and that have had different modes of departure from the island. There is no reason to assume that members of all waves would harbor identical opinions. Moreover, a growing number of the members of the Cuban-American community in south Florida were not born in Cuba. If we refer to the Cubans immigrating to Miami as being composed of waves, the increasing numbers of U.S. born Cubans are the rising tide of the Cuban community.

Despite this identifiable diversity, the political characteristics of the community are considered to be uniform and dominated by an “exile ideology” established by the first wave of post-revolution migrants. The assumption is that the exile experience shaped the collective identity of those fleeing Castro’s revolution, no matter when or how they came, and continues to shape the political identity of Cuban-Americans, particularly when dealing with Cuba and US Cuba policy.

There is evidence that the community is changing its political attitudes and perspectives. These changes seem to be driven by basic social characteristics of the community, which makes one think that the changes effectively constitute trends in the development of Cuban-American political cultures. Basic building blocks of the community, such as demographic composition, and time of departure from Cuba seem to be driving the forces of change while other equally significant dynamics are creating the cultural friction slowing down the process of change. In this latter category I include the political and economic dominance of the earlier waves of exiles as well as the length of time that members of the community have lived in the South Florida area; what I call “the enclave effect”. While we have been gathering evidence for over a decade that lead us to cautiously signal the nature of change in the ideological make up of the Cuban-American community in South Florida, I have my doubts as to whether a completely politically homogenous Cuban-American community every existed. Even the early exiles had divisions among them as to how best deal with the Cuban Revolution and their role in this task. But that is an area to be studied and such theorizing will comprise the last few minutes of my presentation.

In this paper, I’ll explore the issue of political diversity within the Cuban-American population of Miami-Dade County by analyzing the attitudes of different cohorts of Cuban migrants on selected policies. We utilize data from the 2004 Cuba Poll, a telephone survey of 1,811 Cuban-Americans in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties conducted by the author and a colleague in the spring of 2004. While the poll is broad and measures behavioral and attitudinal responses dealing with issues beyond our current concerns, it allows us to focus on a few variables that directly address some of the key elements of the “exile ideology” and its acceptance by the various waves of Cuban migrants. Following Perez’s description of the characteristics of the “exile ideology” (1992), we are particularly concerned with variables that measure 1) a commitment to an uncompromising struggle against the Cuban government, 2) the primacy of Cuba for Cuban-Americans, 3) a lack of tolerance for debate and diversity of views towards Cuba and 3) an overwhelming commitment to the Republican Party. These variables are measured using the wave of arrival characteristics of the respondents as the dependent variables in order to present an exploratory profile of the diversity of the Cuban-American community within the heart of the exile community.
Before getting into the numbers, however, let’s look briefly at one characterization of the differing waves.

**Theorizing the Cuban-American Community**

The first wave of approximately 250,000 Cubans arrived from 1959 to 1964. As with most revolutions, the first people to be affected, and thus the first to leave Cuba, were those in the middle and upper classes (Eckstein, 2002; García, 1996; Grenier, 1992; Pérez, 1990). The second wave of about 300,000 Cubans arrived during the “freedom flights” from 1965 to 1973. The first two cohorts laid the foundation for the creation of a viable Cuban economic enclave in south Florida. The economic enclave founded by middle-class Cubans in these two cohorts accommodated all subsequent arrivals from Cuba and served as a magnet for immigrants from all over Latin America (García, 1996).

The third cohort consists of those who came to the U.S. between the periods of 1974-1979, when the migration between the U.S. and Cuba was diminished. The third wave is also highly educated and includes more professionals than post-1980 cohorts.

The seven-year period of reduced migration came abruptly to an end during the Mariel Crisis of 1980. After Peru refused to turn over Cubans who had killed a guard in the process of crashing through the gates of the Peruvian Embassy, the Cuban government withdrew the remaining guards and thousands of Cubans rushed into the Embassy seeking asylum. Subsequently, Cuban officials opened the port of Mariel to allow all Cubans who wanted to leave the island to do so in an orderly fashion. While the exodus proceeded rather chaotically, 124,776 Cubans did leave from the port of Mariel, and most of them ultimately settled in the South Florida region (Grenier, 1992; Nackerud, 1999; Pedraza, 1996; Pérez, 1990; Poyo, 1989). Unlike the earlier cohorts, these 1980 Cubans lived most of their adult lives in Cuba’s new revolutionary society. This has prompted some analysts to conclude that this migration included more individuals “pushed” by economic necessity rather than by political motives (Eckstein, 2002). Although felons comprised less than 3 percent of the Mariel Cubans, this cohort received a hostile reception in the U.S. (García, 1996; Pedraza, 1985; Portes, 1996). Yet, in spite of the odds against them, they demonstrated patterns of adaptation similar to those of the Cubans who had arrived earlier (García, 1996).

Throughout the years of 1981-1989, the migration between the U.S. and Cuba was severely diminished. The few Cuban Americans who came to the U.S. during this period of time constitute the fifth wave cohort.

The sixth cohort consists of those who came to the U.S. throughout the years of 1990-1995. After the fall of the Soviet Bloc in 1989, Cuba’s importance to U.S. interests was reduced. However, in 1994, a large influx of migrants from Cuba facilitated the historic policy change that officially ended the preferential open door for Cuban immigrants (Nackerud, 1999) and introduced the current “wet-foot/dry-foot” policy (immigrants found at sea are returned to the island while those who make it to land are granted asylum), which characterizes the entry pattern of the seventh cohort, as well as established the minimum number of visas to be granted to Cubans on the island at 20,000 (Nackerud, 1999). The cohort is different from previous Cuban immigrants in that they left their homeland with tacit approval from the Castro government (García, 1996). Black and mixed race Cubans are more represented in this cohort as are many who considered themselves revolutionaries for many years until the opportunity to emigrate presented itself.
Consequently, the cultural diversity within the Cuban community is now more extensive than ever (Garcia, 1996).

1) Uncompromising Attitude against Cuban Government

The embargo constitutes the most important uncompromising attitude against the Cuban government. The U.S. government has maintained some element of an embargo policy since 1959, despite mounting pressure in Congress to loosen it. In the view of hard-liners, the embargo has been the most important instrument for driving Cuba toward reform. But others suggest that the embargo contributes to keeping the country poor, thus hurting the people Cuban Americans are trying to help. This moderate perspective also encourages the initiation of a national dialogue among Cuban Americans and the Cuban government as well as the selling of medicine and food to the island. Some hard-liner Cubans oppose the sale of medicine and food to Cuba, as well as starting a national dialogue primarily because such assistance and recognition would serve only to sustain the Castro regime.

Table 2 suggests that not all Cuban-Americans are in agreement about how to deal with the island, although most manifest a desire to maintain the embargo: 66 percent of all respondents favor continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Yet, there are cohort differences even on this issue. The 1965-1973 cohort exhibits the most intransigent views with 78 percent supporting the continuation of the embargo while only half of those arriving between 1990 and 1995 express a similar view.

However, there are significant differences among the cohorts in the support for some of the restrictions imposed by the embargo. Only 25 percent of all respondents oppose the selling of medicine and 35 percent oppose the selling of food to Cuba. In addition, while 56 percent of the community supports the establishment of a dialogue, strong feelings against such an initiative still exist among some cohorts. The 1965-1973 cohort weighs in with the strongest opposition to a dialogue (59%) and subsequent waves manifest a marked decrease from this highpoint. The 1995-2004 arrivals are the most supportive of the establishment of a dialogue; only 23% of this cohort opposes the idea.

Prohibiting U.S. travel for pleasure to Cuba is another one of the restrictions imposed by the embargo. Figure 2 shows that half of the respondents oppose unrestricted travel to Cuba and, as expected, there are differences among the wave cohorts. The strongest opposition is expressed by the first two waves of arrivals (72 percent and 71 percent in opposition respectively) while the most recent arrivals (e.g. those who have the closest ties to the social environment of the island) are the most supportive of an open travel policy. Like other hard-line measures, far fewer of the more recent émigrés opposed unregulated visitation rights.

2) The Primacy of the Homeland

In the exile ideology, the affairs of the homeland represent the community’s foremost priority. The public discourse is largely preoccupied with the political status of the homeland. A key element of any exile consciousness is the fact that the members of the community were forced out of their country; emigration was not a choice, as with so many other immigrants, but a survival strategy allowing them to live and fight another day. Seen in this light, emigration is part of an enduring conflict.

The importance of Cuba for the Cuban-American community is often ridiculed since Cuba is often seen as central to issues that seem far removed from foreign policy matters,
at least to the general public. For example, Miami-Dade County was the only county in the country with an ordinance preventing county funds from being used in any business activity involving Cuban nationals. In most situations, this prohibition was redundant given the federal trade sanctions currently in place, but the ordinance had a direct impact on local cultural organizations working within the legal limits of the federal trade sanctions. Organizations promoting cultural exchanges, musical or in the plastic arts, faced the prospect of having their county funds suspended or at least publicly scrutinized if Cuban artists were involved in local activities.¹

This obsession with Cuba spills over into the political process in another way. Many Cuban-Americans use the Cuba issue as a litmus test for evaluating candidates for local office. “If you want to run for dog catcher,” said a Cuban-American patron at a sidewalk coffee stand, “you’d better take a hard line position towards Cuba or you’ll never get elected.” While it may not be that extreme, it is true that Miami politics dances to a Cuban beat. As Table 3 demonstrates, a majority of Cuban Americans still consider a candidate’s position towards Cuba to be of primary importance: 54 percent considered a candidate’s position on Cuba as “very” important when casting their vote. The 1965-1973 cohorts exhibit the highest percentage among wave. The salience of Cuba falls dramatically among the second generation Cuban-Americans, only 33% of whom consider a candidate’s position of Cuban issues as being “very important.”

3) Lack of Tolerance for Debate and Divergent Views

The Cuban-American community has been formed by a particular set of political circumstances. Those circumstances have had a great personal impact on members of the community. Cuban-Americans -- as with exiles everywhere -- are therefore not likely to be objective about the situation that has so intrinsically altered their lives and compelled them to live outside their native country. The emotional basis of the exile ideology is what makes Cubans in the U.S. take positions that others else judge to be irrational, as happened in the case of Elián González. Of course, many Cuban exiles will readily, and even proudly, admit to not being rational in matters that have touched them so deeply, and will even flaunt their passionate lack of objectivity. One participant in a Miami demonstration carried a placard that read: Intransigente . . . ¿y qué? (Intransigent . . . so what?).

The least favorable side of emotionalism and irrationality is a traditional intolerance to views that do not conform to the predominant "exile" ideology of an uncompromising hostility towards the Castro regime. Those inside or outside the community who voice views that are "soft" or conciliatory with respect to Castro, or who take a less-than-militant stance in opposition to Cuba’s regime, are usually subjected to criticism and scorn, their position belittled and their motives questioned. Liberals, the "liberal press", most Democrats, pacifists, leftists, academics, intellectuals, "dialoguers," and socialists are favorite targets. Any dissent within the community is especially difficult, since great pressure can be brought to bear on the individual or group. Moreover, intolerance of opposing views has frequently been a source of friction between Cubans and other groups and institutions in Miami. The exiles' inflexible anti-Castroism has frequently been criticized -- and even ridiculed -- by non-Cubans in Miami, especially when it manifests itself as attempts to censor cultural events in Miami by artists or intellectuals from Cuba (Grenier and Perez, 2003).

¹ Although the ordinance was judged unconstitutional in 2000, support for it did not go away. When asked in the FIU Cuba Poll 2000 if they supported the principles of the revoked ordinance, 49 percent of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade said that they did, as compared to 25 percent of non-Cubans.
In an attempt to measure the perception of the public discourse surrounding Cuba in South Florida, respondents were asked whether they considered that all points of views on how to deal with Castro were being heard in Miami. Seventy five percent of the total sample responded that all points of views were not being heard. As a follow up, the respondents were asked which type of views were not being heard. Specifically, were hard line or more conciliatory views not expressed in public discourse? Approximately 60% respondents in all cohort categories perceived that the voice of stronger opposition to Castro was muted in South Florida.

4) Support for the Republican Party

The primacy of the homeland explains the overwhelming preference for the Republican Party, a trait that sets Cubans apart from other Latino groups. Unlike most other Latinos, a majority of Cubans have traditionally voted Republican--due largely to the GOP's perceived strong stance against Fidel Castro (Barreto, 2002; Perez, 1992). Indeed, their initial attraction to the Republican Party was been motivated by their desire to influence policy towards the island, particularly during the presidency of Ronald Reagan (de la Garza, 1994). Their high voter registration and voting rates are signaled as examples of Cuban Americans’ unique political culture (Highton, 2002; Hugo, 2003). Their party preference stands in contrast with other Latino voters who have been traditionally Democrat. Cuban American voters in Miami have helped turn Florida into a bastion of Republicanism. In Florida, they often play a crucial role in determining election outcomes.

Registered Republicans far outnumber registered Democrats among Cubans in Miami in the year 2004, to the tune of approximately 69 percent Republicans and 17 percent Democrats. In the mind of a typical Cuban-American, loyalty to the Republican Party demonstrates the importance of international issues in the political agenda of Cubans. If a substantial number in the Cuban community disagreed with elements of the exile ideology, or if there was a greater balance in that agenda, with importance given to purely domestic issues, the Democratic Party would have made greater inroads.

In fact, if Cuban-Americans were to view themselves as immigrants in this country, rather than as political exiles, and made judgments about political parties based upon their needs and aspirations as immigrants in the United States, they would be Democrats in overwhelming numbers. This would be true not only because of the general social agenda of the Democrats but also because of the specific experience of Cuban migration. The measures that have greatly facilitated Cuban immigration and the adjustment of Cuban-Americans in the United States have all been enacted by Democratic administrations: the Cuban Refugee Emergency Program and its resettlement efforts, the assistance given to the Cuban elderly and the dependent, the establishment of the Airlift or Freedom Flights, and permission for the Mariel boatlift to take place, among others. The fact that Cubans are overwhelmingly Republican is therefore a testimony to the importance of homeland issues and the perception that Republicans are more in tune with the anti-Castro agenda.

As Table 3 shows, 69 percent of Cuban immigrants registered as Republicans but there exist significant differences among wave cohorts. While there are some differences between the cohorts, most migrants from the island, regardless of time of arrival exhibit an impressive level of allegiance to the Republican Party. Those Cuban-American born outside the island, however, are less likely to register as Republicans. This could signal a significant shift in the political power of the community in the near future.

The commitment to the Republican Party by the earlier cohorts can have a significant impact on elections. Their turnout in presidential elections can be as high as 90 percent,
while only between 50 and 60 percent of recent younger cohorts vote (Roman, 1996). The early exiles also have an inordinate influence on the Cuba debate and policy because of their high level of registration and voting activity. Because of this, a policy like the one implemented in 2004 by the white house to curtail trips and remittances can be implemented with minimal political risks. Consider the following: 28% of Cubans living in South Florida arriving before 1974 have traveled to Cuba and 38% send money every year. Of those arriving after 1985 45% have traveled to the island and 75% send money yearly. Now consider that 93% of Cubans in South Florida arriving before 1974 are US citizens and of these 94% are registered to vote. Of those arriving after 1985, 23% are citizens, making the registration figure of 82% relatively insignificant.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although the exile ideology persists and dominates, not all Cuban Americans can be painted with the same brush. The fact is that Cuban-Americans are a diverse population or at least not the political monolith so often portrayed.

Departures from the traditional exile ideology began to manifest themselves at the end of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cuban exiles who had long struggled to overthrow an entrenched socialist regime, now had in Eastern Europe an operational model of how such a thing might be accomplished. Rather than an overnight “rupture” scenario traditionally envisioned by the exiles, the new model involved an evolution that might be led by elements from within “the system”, a process that could be helped by openness rather than hostility and isolation. Consequently, some Cuban Americans, including some traditional hardliners, began to espouse a strategy of promoting a relaxation of tensions with Havana and engaging elements within Cuba. The rise of this new orientation led in the 1990's to the establishment of several organizations that, in different ways, conceptualized anti-Castro activism in more moderate terms, espousing an elimination of hostility and emphasizing constructive relations with the Cuban government. These new organizations have been committed to a peaceful transition to democracy that would not be based on confrontation and hostility.

These developments served to broaden the ideological spectrum of Cuban exile politics, creating new voices that argued against a continuation of the current U.S. policy. Although these new elements have thus far failed to gain predominance within the community, they have served to challenge what had been a monolithic image of exile politics, providing support for initiatives that challenge the traditional course of U.S.-Cuba relations.

The 1994 and 1995 migration accords between the U.S. and Cuba raised the ceiling for Cuban migration to the U.S. Since then, over 20,000 Cubans have come to the U.S. each year in an authorized fashion, in addition to the smaller number who arrive through unauthorized means. In addition to the new arrivals, two other important sectors of the Cuban population of the U.S. tend to add diversity to the political culture: the new generations and those living outside of Miami. The FIU poll shows that members of the second generation born in the United States are much more conciliatory in their views towards island politics than their parents. The same is true of Cubans who do not live within the insularity of the Miami enclave and are therefore less likely to have maintained an exile ideology. According to the 1995 poll, Cubans living in New Jersey are more likely to favor a dialogue with the Castro regime than those living in Miami. Similarly, New Jersey Cubans are less likely to be influenced by a candidate’s position on Cuba as they cast their vote in local and national elections. As the process of concentration in South Florida continues, the
arrival in Miami of Cubans who have lived elsewhere in the U.S. adds yet another source of pluralism to the political landscape.

Yet, despite the obvious attitudinal diversity of the Cuban-American population regarding Cuba policy, or perhaps because of this diversity, the persistence of certain hard-line attitudes still require examination. The continued support for the embargo, for example, seems to be impervious to pragmatic policy considerations. It seems that support for the embargo underscores yet another trait of the political culture of Cubans in the U.S.: the importance of emotion over pragmatism. While admitting that the embargo may be ineffective, and, further, even recognizing that lifting it may well bring about significant changes in Cuba, a majority in the Cuban community continue to oppose any such softening of U.S. policy because of its symbolism. If the U.S. abandons its hard-line stance against Cuba, the argument goes, Fidel Castro will have "won" the forty-year struggle. It is therefore a struggle that is based not so much on pragmatism as it is on emotion (Fernandez, 2000).

Ultimately, the Cuban-American story in the United States is a paradoxical one. On the one hand, Cuban-Americans are held up as examples of the "immigrant success story." As immigrants, the Cuban-American story is one of achievement and victories. It is the story of an immigrant group that has made unprecedented gains in empowering themselves in the new country. The well documented economic success, as well as equally impressive achievements through the ballot box, has resulted in the creation of a solid ethnic enclave in a region that is often considered to be the harbinger of the multiethnic American future. These achievements have earned praise and respect from others and have created a positive image of Cuban Americans as strong entrepreneurs with extraordinary political influence in South Florida.

Yet, the Cuban-American identity is not an immigrant one but one of exiles. As exiles Cuban-Americans often behave in ways that the rest of the country finds unreasonable and even irrational. The exile story is one of the relentless and enduring pursuit of the exile goal of recovering the homeland by triumphing over the regime, or more accurately, the person, who is responsible for their exile. That pursuit has frequently led to unfortunate episodes and behaviors, most evident during the Elián González saga, in which Cuban Americans were heavily criticized and viewed with derision and ridiculed by many non-Cubans in Miami and throughout the nation. It is a story of frustration, misunderstandings, and resentment.

The contrast of the two stories is ironic. The core of the identity of Cubans in the U.S. is as exiles, not immigrants. If the goal of exiles is to recover the homeland, and the job of immigrants is to successfully adjust economically and empower themselves in the new country, then we can reach the conclusion first formulated by our colleague Max Castro: Cubans in the U.S. have been a failure at what they say they are, and a success at what they say they are not.

REFERENCES


Table 1
Socio Economic Profile of Cuban-Americans in South Florida
By Wave and Mode of Arrival
(Cuba Poll 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave of Arrival</th>
<th>Mean age</th>
<th>Median age</th>
<th>1.5 Gen</th>
<th>College graduate and more</th>
<th>Household income below 20,000</th>
<th>Household Income 50,000 and more</th>
<th>Race: White</th>
<th>Gender: Female</th>
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<tr>
<td>Before 1959</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959-1964</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>58%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965-1974</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1984</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1985</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Born</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode of Arrival</td>
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<td>Flight to US</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>57%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flight to Other County</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>54%</td>
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<td>By Boat</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<tr>
<td>By Raft</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* 1.5 Generation refer to those who came to the U.S. aged 1-14.
Table 2
Measures of Uncompromising Attitudes Towards Cuban Government
By Wave
(Cuba Poll 2004)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Favor of Continuing the U.S. embargo</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to selling medicine to Cuba</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose to selling food to Cuba</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Should not allow unrestricted travel to Cuba</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose national dialogue among Cuban exiles, dissidents, and representatives of the Cuban government</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
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Table 3
Measures of Continued Primacy of Cuba and Intolerance to Diverse Views
By Wave
(Cuba Poll 2004)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Important: Political candidate's position on Cuba</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views Supporting Stronger Opposition Not Heard in Miami</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Republican</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>73.2%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Cuban Migration by Wave of Arrival

Source: Neckrud, 1999

Figure 2

Theorizing the Creation of the Cuban Community in Miami

Political Exile Migration  Social Exile Migration  Detent Migration  Mariel Migration  Promised Land Migration  Transnational Migration


1 2004 Cuban Poll was conducted by Guillermo Grenier and Hugh Gladwin at Florida International University with a sample of 1,811 Miami-Dade and Broward Counties residents of Cuban descent, which was generated from telephone survey using standard random-digit-dialing procedures that ensured that each residential phone had an equal chance of being chosen for the sample.